

# South-South Cooperation and Training for Peacekeeping Participation

## *Expertise and Status in Brazil's Involvement in Africa and Latin America*

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## Abstract

This article explores the provision of assistance for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping through the lens of South-South cooperation and considerations of expertise and international status. More specifically, the article analyses recent attempts by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) in sharing Brazil's accumulated expertise from the 13 years of engagement in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with other Global South countries. While the article contributes to the understanding of how Brazil tries to renegotiate its peripheral position in the domain of peacekeeping, it also interrogates how this new authoritative position is, nevertheless, permeated by ambiguities and limitations.

## Keywords

Brazil – peacekeeping – United Nations – Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center – mobile training teams – training – status – expertise

## I Introduction: Status, Expertise and Peacekeeping

Contrary to the Cold War period, when peacekeeping evolved in an *ad hoc* basis and little attention was paid to training, in the last 25 years, several public and private as well as national, regional, and international centers have improved their efforts towards providing training for United Nations (UN) peacekeepers.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Alberto Cuttito, *Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers – Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 5 (New York: *International Peace Institute*, 2013).

The search for growing effectiveness of UN troops has come with several challenges including the necessity to guarantee “that training, no matter where it is done and by whom, adheres to common standards and produces peacekeepers with the necessary skill sets”.<sup>2</sup> This situation has placed the UN at the center of a global training architecture for peacekeeping and has resulted in several institutional developments aiming to consolidate parameters to be followed globally by training institutions and to establish ways of certifying these institutions.

While the first training institutes created were located in the Global North, several training centers are now consolidated in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, following the growing engagement of countries from these regions in UN peacekeeping activities.<sup>3</sup> The radical reduction of North American and European troops in UN peacekeeping delineated a tendency in which Western countries have both opened their centers for professionals from other nationalities and/or launched activities dedicated exclusively to training foreign officers, mainly from developing countries. A more recent tendency concerns cooperation agreements for peacekeeping training established *between* Southern states or institutions. For example, in February 2017, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense signed a cooperation agreement regarding cooperation on peacekeeping training centers. As part of the agreement, Brazil designated two officers to serve as instructors in the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre (FRDE-PSTC).<sup>4</sup>

Recent efforts in sharing practices associated with training for UN peacekeeping participation can be analyzed via the literature associated with expertise and international status. This article looks at this connection by focusing on the specific case of Brazil and recent attempts by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) in sharing Brazil’s accumulated expertise with other countries in the Global South. We claim that similar to the case of Colombia, which has exported its domestic strategy of fighting drug trafficking, Brazil’s use of its expertise in training for peacekeeping participation is an

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2 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

3 Philip Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2014).

4 Brazilian instructors will be at the Ethiopian center for a period of three months, with possible extension for an additional two months. The Brazilian officers will be responsible for the development of new curriculum to be used by the Ethiopian center in the areas of Civil-Military Coordination and Staff Officer Integrated Planning. See: Telegram 68 from Brazilian Embassy in Addis Ababa to SERE date: 14/02/2017.

example of how “the country’s newly found status as a security exporter has been used to gain legitimacy at the regional and world level”.<sup>5</sup>

The Brazilian engagement in South-South cooperation (SSC) for UN peacekeeping training is conceived here as a process through which Brazil tries to rearticulate its position in the global architecture of UN peacekeeping, particularly at a moment in which this architecture is facing a critical period, with the reduction of its budget.<sup>6</sup> CCOPAB’s Mobile Training Teams although still considered as a timid experimentation in the context of a peacekeeping “training-of-trainers” exercise, intends to move Brazil from a position of receptor of training expertise to that of a “donor” one, from which the country contributes to diffuse consolidated norms and practical knowledge on UN peacekeeping.<sup>7</sup>

While expertise was historically associated with the Global North, in recent years, and particularly because of China’s economic growth and technological development, countries of the Global South are now recognized as having the necessary experience and skills that would qualify them as bearing expertise in specific areas, including security. Within the discipline of International Relations, there have been efforts to address the strategic use of expertise (and expert knowledge) for political reasons.<sup>8</sup> The article advances the conceptualization of expertise as “a social position that gives experts prominence over public interests and wider society”.<sup>9</sup> We also acknowledge expertise as “something someone obtains/is attributed due to knowledge and credibility”.<sup>10</sup>

Our analysis of Brazil’s use of its expertise training for UN peacekeeping also confirms the observation that “expertise is always about something that

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5 Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Associated Dependent Security Cooperation: Colombia and the United States’ in Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller (eds.), *The Global Making of Policing: Postcolonial Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 97.

6 For the reduction of the UN peacekeeping budget see: <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-06-30/un-agrees-to-cut-peacekeeping-budget-a-reduction-us-sought>

7 Georgina Holmes, ‘Situating Agency, Embodied Practices and Norm Implementation in Peacekeeping Training’, *International Peacekeeping*, August 2018, pp. 1–30.

8 Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, ‘Expert Knowledge as a Strategic Resource: International Bureaucrats and the Shaping of Bioethical Standards’, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 61, no. 3, September 2017, pp. 584–595.

9 Robert Evans, ‘The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency’, *Sociology Compass*, vol. 2, no. 1, January 2008, pp. 281–298.

10 Leah Sprain and Lydia Reinig, ‘Citizens Speaking as Experts: Expertise Discourse in Deliberative Forums’, *Environmental Communication*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2018, p. 358.

is relevant for an audience".<sup>11</sup> The influence of 13 years of contributing to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in raising Brazil's status as a credible provider of training for peacekeeping supports the notion of expertise as a "relational attribution in which you acquire status of an expert by virtue of your position in a network of social relations".<sup>12</sup> Likewise, this notion is closely connected to Andrew Hurrell's interpretation of status and how it relates to a country's international standing: "being a great power has never been solely about the possession of large amounts of crude material power. It has been closely related to notions of legitimacy and authority".<sup>13</sup> In their analysis of international status seeking, Wohlforth *et al* point out that status holds a *positional* (comparative dimension), *perceptual* (regarding self-perception and those of others) and *social* dimension (associated with a collective belief regarding the actor's international standing).<sup>14</sup> These three features can be associated with Brazil's involvement in the provision of assistance in training for peacekeeping participation, as the analysis presented here will show.

In regards to the specific association between peacekeeping and international status, Suzuki and Krishnasamy discuss how states seek to enhance their status by contributing with troops.<sup>15</sup> Our argument here is that status-seeking behavior can also be related to a country's engagement in the provision of training for participation in peacekeeping missions. At the same time, this training activity can increase the possibility of unintended (negative) consequences affecting the domestic arena of the state receiving the training, as well as increasing risks to other countries. In this respect, Beswick draws attention as to how these unintended consequences could undermine "the reputation of the donor government itself, alongside the rewards of continuing or reconsidering

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- 11 Arie Rip, 'Constructing Expertise: In a Third Wave of Science Studies?', *Social Studies of Science*, vol. 33, no. 3, June 2003, p. 420.
  - 12 Robert Evans, 'The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency', *Sociology Compass*, vol. 2, no. 1, January 2008, pp. 282.
  - 13 Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?", *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, January 2006, pp. 1–19.
  - 14 William Wohlforth *et al.*, 'Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 44, no. 3, July 2018, p. 527.
  - 15 Shogo Suzuki, 'Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO', *International Relations*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, pp. 45–63; Kabilan Krishnasamy, 'Recognition' for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 8, no. 4, 2001, pp. 56–76.

the relationship'.<sup>16</sup> Providing training for peacekeeping participation could be, therefore, a double-edged sword in regards to a country's international status.

The participation in MINUSTAH, initiated in June 2004, and the creation of Brazil's peacekeeping training center (C10pPaz at the time and later called CCOPAB), in 2005, raised Brazil's status within the peacekeeping training community. Similar to Hurrell's previous considerations, in the specific case of Brazil, Larson and Shevchenko note that:

Brazil's achievement of major power status is less contingent on whether it meets certain material power benchmarks (...) than on the international community's willingness to confer status based on new criteria of diplomatic skill, coalition-building success, and norm entrepreneurship.<sup>17</sup>

At the same time, the direct connection between the deployment to MINUSTAH and the development of this Brazilian expertise created a dilemma for the country, illustrated in the idea that: "If becoming an expert means becoming socialized into a specialist community, then becoming an expert means running the risk of becoming blinkered in one's outlook".<sup>18</sup> In fact, much of the Brazilian expertise became associated with the contribution to a single UN mission (MINUSTAH), where Brazil was able to hold the command of the military component for the 13 years of deployment and to provide the largest troop contingent.

Considering the recent (post-2004) Brazilian engagement in UN peacekeeping in light of notions and claims of expertise and international status, this article undertakes three movements, which, beyond this Introduction and Final Considerations, are reflected in three different parts. The first part discusses the current global architecture for UN peacekeeping training and its related governance mechanisms. The second analyzes the institutionalization of CCOPAB and the acquisition of a peacekeeping training expertise by Brazil, resulting from the engagement in Haiti and the strategic interactions established in the context of MINUSTAH with partner countries, especially from the South American region. The third part specifically approaches the so-called

16 Dani lle Beswick, 'The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons From Rwanda', *African Affairs*, vol. 113, no. 451, April 2014, p. 230.

17 Larson, Deborah and Shevchenko, Alexei, 'Managing Rising Powers: The Role of Status Concerns' in T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth (eds.), *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 53.

18 Robert Evans, 'The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency', *Sociology Compass*, vol. 2, no. 1, January 2008, p. 286.

“Mobile Training Teams” (MTT) deployed by CCOPAB. This analysis contributes to understand how Brazilian decision makers have tried to renegotiate Brazil’s peripheral position in the hierarchical global governance of UN peace operations. Moreover, the analysis presented here allows for the interrogation of how this new authoritative position achieved by Brazil in the domain of UN peacekeeping is, nevertheless, permeated by several ambiguities and limits.

One final introductory consideration involves the references used in the present article. In addition to academic references, the article benefits from direct visits to CCOPAB throughout 2017, which included interviews and facilitated access to official reports from the different MTT. The article also benefits from access to Brazilian diplomatic communication obtained through Brazil’s Access to Information Law.<sup>19</sup>

## II The Governance and Architecture of UN Peacekeeping Training

The current global architecture of UN peacekeeping emerged when the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) started encouraging member states to establish national training programs for military personnel, police and civilians for peacekeeping operations and requested the Secretary-General to prepare training manuals, which member states “might wish to use as guidelines for their national or regional training”.<sup>20</sup> The production of more specific and standardized guidelines gained force mainly after the tragedy in Rwanda. In 1995, the General Assembly, through Resolution 49/37 (1995), called upon the Secretary General to prepare training materials to troop-contributing member states and to those interested in participating in future peace operations. A more permanent division of labor between member states and the UN was established: troop-contributing countries would train their personnel and

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19 The authors looked at diplomatic communication exchanged between the Foreign Ministry headquarters in Brasília (*Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores-SERE*) and different diplomatic missions in countries which have either hosted Brazilian MTT (Colombia, Mozambique) or countries with which Brazil discussed bilateral cooperation regarding training for peacekeeping participation (Argentina, Ethiopia, Paraguay, Peru and South Africa). We would like to thank Ana Sofia, Daisy Teles, Giovanna Giannini, Izabella Abreu and Pedro Lopes for their research assistance.

20 UN General Assembly Resolution 44/49 (December 8, 1989), UN Doc. A/RES/44/49, para. 6. Available at: [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/82440/files/A\\_RES\\_44\\_49-EN.pdf](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/82440/files/A_RES_44_49-EN.pdf).

the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would consolidate itself as a verifier of this training.<sup>21</sup>

Although the C-34 reports published since 1989 and the Brahimi Report (2000) have emphasized the importance of training for enhancing UN peace operations capabilities, it was only in 2008 that the DPKO released a three-year “UN Peacekeeping Strategy” and a “Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment.”<sup>22</sup> Since the production of these documents, the UN, through its Integrated Training Service (ITS), has firmly place itself at the heart of ongoing efforts to establish a coherent though constantly evolving training strategy.<sup>23</sup> ITS is the main office within the UN system responsible for the oversight of all UN peacekeeping training and for providing relevant policy, guidance and support.<sup>24</sup> As emphasized by UN General Assembly Resolution 63/680, the Service is also “responsible for providing current peacekeeping training standards for all phases of training, based on departmental priorities and policies, lessons learned and best practices”.<sup>25</sup> It is expected that ITS disseminates its training standards to all peacekeeping training partners, including member states and field missions, and “provides technical support and guidance on the design, delivery and evaluation of peacekeeping training to continually improve the consistency and quality of training, whether in the field or at headquarters”.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, ITS “is responsible for monitoring the implementation of peacekeeping training standards and for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of training activities.”<sup>27</sup>

According to a former senior Brazilian Army official who served at CCO-PAB and at DPKO, the movement that consolidated ITS programs and guidance within the UN system has been carried out in constant consultation with member states and training centers, resulting in a peacekeeping training

21 Interview, via Skype, with senior Brazilian Army officer who served at CCO-PAB and DPKO. February 2017.

22 DPKO Integrated Training Service, “Report on the Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment,” October 2008. Available at: <[http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89580/2008%20Strategic\\_Training\\_Needs\\_Assessment\\_Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89580/2008%20Strategic_Training_Needs_Assessment_Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)>; DPKO Integrated Training Service, “UN Peacekeeping Training Strategy,” May 2008.

23 Alberto Cuttito, Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers – Providing for Peacekeeping No. 5 (New York: *International Peace Institute*, 2013), p. 2.

24 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/266 (June 30, 2006).

25 *Ibid.* para. 8.

26 *Ibid.*

27 *Ibid.*

architecture overtly based on shared rules and understandings.<sup>28</sup> This process resulted in the institutionalization of *peacekeeping training* as:

any training activity which aims to enhance mandate implementation by equipping UN military, police or civilian personnel, both individually and collectively, with the *knowledge, skills* and *attitudes* to enable them to: a) meet the evolving challenges of peacekeeping operations in accordance with DPKO/DFS principles, policies and guidelines, as well as lessons learnt from the field; b) perform their specialist functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner and; c) demonstrate the core values and competencies of the UN.<sup>29</sup>

The UN strategy for training is broadly divided in three phases but “pre-deployment training” is clearly considered the vital phase. While member states have the primary responsibility for pre-deployment training, peacekeeping training has to be seen as a joint endeavor, with the UN Secretariat responsible for setting common standards and certifying the quality of training courses offered by member states and training institutions.<sup>30</sup> Although the UN has played an increased authoritative role inside the current peacekeeping training architecture, its impact is necessarily limited since it cannot oblige or even ensure that all personnel deployed have been properly trained and have developed the necessary skills and attitudes, as envisaged by the DPKO ITS.

One institutional mechanism made available to TCCs to assist them in fulfilling their Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) obligations is the ‘Mobile Training Support Teams’ (MTSTs). MTSTs are an instrument by which the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) can provide on-site assistance to a specific Peacekeeping Training Institution (PKTI) regarding pre-deployment

28 Interview, via Skype, with senior Brazilian Army officer who served at CCOPAB and DPKO. February 2017.

29 We have used here the UN definition of peacekeeping training: <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/Training>.

30 The broad set of operational guidelines and instructions developed by the UN for greater coordination and standardization of training for peacekeeping missions can be accessed online. It is through the Peacekeeping Resource Hub that training centers and other institutions can obtain the main training and guidance materials developed by the UN. Some of these documents can be accessed through a registration on the UN website. Other training materials are freely available. Such materials include for instance the Core Pre Deployment Training Materials (CPTM), the Specialized Training Materials (STM) and the Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation.

training.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, the ITS also conducts ‘training of trainers’ courses (ToT) as part of its role in providing trainers with the necessary knowledge and skills essential for delivering pre-deployment training according to UN standards.

Beyond the UN, communities of practice have emerged in response to peacekeeping training needs.<sup>32</sup> An important international institution concerned with ensuring a common UN peacekeeping training standard worldwide is the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI). POTI is an independent not-for-profit organization governed by a Board of Directors. It offers several on-line/distance courses on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations and works in partnership with regional institutions from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

At the regional level, some non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations established several peacekeeping centers in order to explore a military, police and civilian cooperation and dialogue. Some examples include the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCPA), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Peace Operations Training Centre (POTC), the Peacekeeping Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC), the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). These institutions, affiliated to the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), also contribute geographically to the diffusion of UN peacekeeping standards and procedures.<sup>33</sup>

31 If a Member State or associated PKTI requires specific technical training support to design, develop, implement, evaluate or review their United Nations Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training program, it may request such assistance from DPKO/DFS.

32 Paul D. Williams, ‘United Kingdom’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 93–114.

33 Established in 1995 as “an open and voluntary association of centers, institutions, agencies and programs dealing with peace operations research, education, and training”, the IAPTC aims at ensuring more effectiveness to UN peace operation by diffusing a better understanding of the UN peacekeeping principles and guidelines. IAPTC shares several best practices and provides a space for socialization among the peacekeeping community throughout the world: education centers, academic/ research institutions, non-governmental actors and other personnel “responsible for, and involved in, training for peacekeeping operations” (IAPTC, 2018); International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres – Background, <https://iaptc.org/background>, date accessed: August 27, 2018.

At the national level, some UN member states, especially the permanent five members of the Security Council, support several training initiatives. The US, represents the largest bilateral capacity-builder, “spending US\$ 85–115 million annually to train and equip peacekeepers from other countries” through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).<sup>34</sup> The United Kingdom follows the same path by deploying several missions to contribute to doctrine and training in hostile environments.<sup>35</sup> Other permanent members that have been increasing their participation in UN peacekeeping, like China and Russia, are stimulating a national, regional and international dialogue among several institutions in order to enhance their capabilities.<sup>36</sup>

After discussing some of the general aspects associated with the global governance of peacekeeping training architecture, our analysis will now focus on the specificities of the Brazilian case.

### III Brazil, MINUSTAH and Peacekeeping Training Expertise

Brazil’s emergence as a credible provider of training for peacekeeping participation is inherently connected to its 13 years of engagement in MINUSTAH (2004–2017). Before 2005, no integrated center of the Brazilian Armed Forces existed to prepare the military, police and civilian personnel to be deployed in UN missions.<sup>37</sup> In 2005, the Peace Operations Instruction Center (CIOPaz – acronym in Portuguese) was created, with the aim to:

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- 34 Adam C. Smith, ‘United States of America’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 77.
- 35 Paul D. Williams, ‘United Kingdom’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 101.
- 36 Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, ‘The People’s Republic of China’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 147; Nikitin, Alexander, ‘The Russian Federation’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 172.
- 37 From 1948–2005, Brazilian peacekeepers were trained by seven different Regional Military Commands. From 1995 to 2001, the 5<sup>th</sup> Subcommittee of the Brazilian Army General Staff (responsible for dealing with International Special Issues) held the responsibility, at the operational and tactical level, to plan and conduct the Brazilian participation in UN peace operations. Subsequently, based on the Administrative Order No. 094 of March 12, 2001, the Terrestrial Operations Command (COTER), which is the sectoral and operational

(...) contribute to the research, development and validation of the Land Force's doctrine of employment in respect of peace operations; to plan and conduct courses and internships for military and civilian training, small fractions, platoons, subunits and units designated for the performance of peace operations; to cooperate with the Army Teaching Institutions when conducting seminars, exercises and other activities related to peace operations; to participate in the evaluation of the military, fractions, subunits and units designated for the accomplishment of peace operations; to prepare military personnel assigned to courses abroad for peace operations, as well as conduct other special, ad-hoc, organized courses; to prepare military observers and staff officers assigned to peace operations; to cooperate with the training of human resources of the other Armed Forces, Auxiliary Forces, government agencies and civil entities; and, under the guidance of COTER, to plan and conduct the preparation of contingents for peace operations.<sup>38</sup>

Based on this new configuration in the Brazilian Army, the Land Operations Command (COTER) created the Division of Peace Missions (Div Mis Paz – acronym in Portuguese), which is still operating, and serves as “a virtual Center for preparation and doctrinal accompaniment”.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, Div Mis Paz has been assisting the military personnel and officials deployed in individual missions.<sup>40</sup> Five years later, on June 15, 2010, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MD) replaced CIOpPaz with the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). While CCOPAB maintained the same hierarchical relationship with the Brazilian Army, it was created as a joint center, directly linked to the MD. Aiming at facilitating the interoperability of the Brazilian Armed Forces and increasing the dialogue among these Forces in the context of UN

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steering body of the Brazilian Army, within the framework of its 1st Sub-Office (Operational Preparation of the Ground Force), created the Brazilian Army's Center for Preparation and Evaluation for Peacekeeping Missions (CEPAEB – acronym in Portuguese). CEPAEB was responsible for mobilizing, establishing guidelines to prepare, follow-up and support any ongoing mission, as well as to plan, offer doctrinal assistance and demobilization to the Brazilian military troops.

38 As a result, all activities conducted by CEPAEB were transferred to this new Center – subordinated to the Eastern Military Command and the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Division; Comando de Operações Terrestres – Histórico da Divisão de Missão de Paz, <http://www.coter.eb.mil.br/divmispaz/index.php/historico>, date accessed: May 28, 2017.

39 *Ibid.*

40 This dynamic resulted in the creation of the Follow Up and Support Group to the Peace Missions in the Context of Earth Force (GAAPAZ – acronym in Portuguese).

peace operations, CCOPAB became the main official reference when it comes to preparing, training and teaching UN normative and doctrinal standards.

CCOPAB was given the mission “to support the preparation of military, police and civilian personnel from Brazil and friendly nations for peace missions and humanitarian demining missions”.<sup>41</sup> The center offers several courses that have been certified by ITS. This certification is important because it has been central for CCOPAB to build its expertise associated with training for peacekeeping participation.<sup>42</sup>

As previously mentioned, the creation of CIOPaz and then of CCOPAB all took place as Brazil was already deployed to MINUSTAH, which reinforces the idea that the involvement of Brazil, and other South American countries, in MINUSTAH as an enabler of the diffusion of expertise associated with training for peacekeeping participation should not be underestimated. This is illustrated by looking at some of the concrete collaborative regional defense initiatives that emerged out of the South American participation in MINUSTAH, emphasizing training for peacekeeping participation as a goal that South American troop contributing countries should pursue. These initiatives include the 2x9 mechanism, which counted on the participation of the ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Latin American countries contributing to MINUSTAH.<sup>43</sup> During a 2007 meeting of the mechanism, participating representatives

41 Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil – Sobre o CCOPAB, <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/sobre-o-ccopab>, date accessed: May 28, 2017.

42 *The Standard Operation Procedure: Training Recognition* (2009) is the UN document that normalizes the certification processes. Courses that are not foreseen under the ITS guidelines, under the aegis of Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and Specialized Training Materials (STMs), are recognized under the title of Training Acknowledgment and are still in the process of standardization of validation. Until May 2018 the DPKO/DFS, at different times, certified CCOPAB (for a period of four years, with a possible renewable certification) in five Courses: United Nations Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise (expired in 2018 and up for renewal) / United Nations Military Observer / Staff Officer Course / United Nations Police Officer / Civil Military Coordination. Other Courses offered by CCOPAB may follow or not the STM and the CPTM are in the process of certification by ITS.

43 The 2x9 mechanism originated when the deputy ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil and Chile met in a 2x3 format to discuss the situation in Haiti after the beginning of MINUSTAH. By May 2005, Uruguay became involved in the discussions. By February 2007, the group had a 2x9 format, since it also included other Latin American troop contributing countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru; Rut Diamint, ‘El 2x9: Una Incipiente Comunidad de Seguridad en América Latina?’ – Programa de Cooperación em Seguridad Regional n. 18 (Bogotá: *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Colombia*, 2009).

recommend the development of a training of trainers' course on peacekeeping.<sup>44</sup> A second important initiative was the creation of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) in August 2008.<sup>45</sup> The creation of ALCOPAZ has contributed to the diffusion of knowledge and expertise associated with training for peacekeeping participation. The association's Constitutive Statute includes, as one of its goals: "to standardize the procedures related to the training of personnel to participate in peace missions."<sup>46</sup> The creation of ALCOPAZ facilitated the socialization of Latin American TCCs into the IAPTC, especially when CCOPAB hosted IAPTC's annual meeting in 2015.<sup>47</sup>

Even before CCOPAB developed its MTT (to be discussed further bellow) as a strategy for the dissemination of the Brazilian experience accumulated in MINUSTAH, such experience was already been diffused via Brazil's cooperative initiatives with fellow South American countries. One of the first diffusion opportunities took place with Paraguay. The two countries had a history of military cooperation dating back to the Brazilian Military Instruction Mission in Paraguay (1942–1994) and to the Brazilian Military Cooperation in Paraguay (initiated in 1996 and which continues to this day).<sup>48</sup> This previous history of active military-to-military interaction facilitated the negotiation of an agreement regarding Paraguayan participation within the Brazilian battalion in MINUSTAH. The agreement was signed in December 2006 and paved the way for the incorporation of foreign military officers into the Brazilian contingent, including from Bolivia, Canada and Peru.<sup>49</sup>

For Brazil, diffusing experience associated with training for peacekeeping participation is essential to reinforce the country's influence within partner countries with whom Brazil has engaged in military and defense cooperation, particularly in its immediate regional neighborhood, thus reinforcing the

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44 This course was left under the responsibility of Argentina's CAECOPAZ, which organized the first edition of the 'General José de San Martín' International Course of Trainers in Peace Operations in August 2007. A second edition of the course took place in August 2008 also at Argentina's CAECOPAZ. Telegram 1419 from Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires to SERE date: 14/07/2008.

45 In Portuguese: *Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamientos para Operaciones de Paz – ALCOPAZ*.

46 Telegram 1621 from Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires to SERE date: 06/08/2008.

47 For the coverage of the event see: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/en/noticias-do-centro/2015/737-inicia-em-brasilia-df-a-reuniao-do-comite-executivo-da-conferencia-anual-da-iaptc-2015>.

48 Telegram 469 from Brazilian Embassy in Asunción to SERE date: 15/03/2014.

49 Telegram 143 from Brazilian Embassy in Asunción to SERE date: 25/03/2015.

social dimension of Brazil's status associated with training for peacekeeping. Because diffusing its expertise is a strategic asset, Brazilian diplomats have monitored and reported back to Brasília about competing attempts by other countries regarding training for peacekeeping participation. For example, in 2007, even before Brazil began accepting Peruvian officers in its contingent in MINUSTAH, Brazilian diplomats in Lima reported that the US was presenting an agreement in which it was offering US\$4.4 million for training and re-equipment of the Peruvian Armed Forces regarding peacekeeping participation.<sup>50</sup> As in the case of Peru, Brazilian diplomats based in Chile also reported back to Brasília in 2007 regarding Chile's participation in the GPOI, which meant that Chile received US\$1 million annually to be used in training for peacekeeping participation. The fact that Brazilian diplomats paid attention to competing initiatives implemented by the US refers to the positional dimension of status. It is likely that Brazilian diplomats reported on those competing initiatives to draw attention in Brasília to US influence in Peru and Chile regarding training for peacekeeping participation.

In addition to keeping an eye in competing offers of training, Brazil used training and the possibility of participating in UN missions as a strategy to steer Colombia away from further US defense and security influence, reinforcing Brazil's security agenda within South America. In 2013, Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim suggested to the Colombian Defense Minister that privileging UN collective security mechanisms was a better strategy than deepening relations with the US and NATO.<sup>51</sup> Amorim's suggestions appear to have succeeded, Colombia and the UN signed a framework agreement in January 2015, allowing for Colombia, when the country's authority seem appropriate, to contribute with troops to UN missions. Colombia's contribution is expected to take place in situations that are not considered to present risks to Colombia's internal security.<sup>52</sup> At the Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos mentioned that Colombia intended to contribute with 5,000 troops to UN missions after 2018.<sup>53</sup>

50 At the time, Peru was involved with troops at United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and with staff officers in missions in the African continent. Telegram 1099 from Brazilian Embassy in Lima to SERE date: 16/07/2007.

51 Telegram 306 from Brazilian Embassy in Bogotá to SERE date: 01/04/2016.

52 Telegram 104 from Brazilian Embassy in Bogotá to SERE date: 30/01/2015. The January 2015 agreement with the UN was approved by the Colombian Senate in November 2015. Telegram 306 from Brazilian Embassy in Bogotá to SERE date: 01/04/2016.

53 Telegram 306 from Brazilian Embassy in Bogotá to SERE date: 01/04/2016. The case of Colombia is particularly interesting when it comes to the diffusion of practices associated with peace and security because although Colombia has a limited presence as a

While the diffusion of training for peacekeeping was important for Brazil to promote relations with neighboring South American countries, the diffusion of training was also important to consolidate relations with African partners. In late 2008, the Brazilian Embassy in Maputo reported that the Mozambican Minister of Defense had invited his Brazilian counterpart to visit Mozambique to discuss cooperation in the defense sector, including regarding peacekeeping participation. The embassy suggested that Mozambique could be a pilot case of Brazil-Africa cooperation in training for peacekeeping participation and that, after receiving Brazilian training, a Mozambican platoon could be incorporated into the Brazilian contingent in MINUSTAH. The embassy suggested that after a period of 2–3 years, the Mozambican Armed Forces would have a professionally trained company with experience in peace missions, which could be deployed into other missions, including in the African continent.<sup>54</sup> The initial intention to develop Mozambique as a pilot case for Brazilian cooperation involved a June 2009 visit by officers from then CIOpPaz.<sup>55</sup> Nonetheless, the cooperation with Mozambique did not develop any further. At the same time that the embassy suggested the positive implications of the Brazil-Mozambique partnership, the embassy noted that the US and the United Kingdom had recently assisted Mozambique with the recovery of a military base that could be used to train members of the Mozambican Armed Forces in peace missions.<sup>56</sup> The fact that Brazilian authorities were monitoring *similar* initiatives by other countries also reveals the positional dimension of status. In addition, the lack of a concrete Brazil-Mozambique training for peacekeeping partnership reflects the challenges associated with SSC in general: the competition with partners from the Global North, the lack of financial resources to materialize aspirations of cooperation as well as rapidly changing priorities in national capitals.

Since the rise of Brazil's expertise was closely associated with the deployment to Haiti, the reduction of troops within MINUSTAH, which implied the reduction of the Brazilian contingent, certainly affected Brazil's capacities to disseminate its expertise at the local level. The troop reduction was announced by UNSC resolution 2180 of October 2014 and this led to the end of the participation of foreign officers within the Brazilian contingent, affecting the

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UN troop contributor, Colombian authorities have diffused the country's security strategy to countries in Central America and the Caribbean as well as in West Africa.

54 Telegram 983 from Brazilian Embassy in Maputo to SERE date: 09/12/2008.

55 Telegram 475 from Brazilian Embassy in Maputo to SERE date: 25/05/2009 and Telegraphic dispatch 324 from SERE to Brazilian Embassy in Maputo date: 27/05/2009.

56 Telegram 983 from Brazilian Embassy in Maputo to SERE date: 09/12/2008.

participation of officers from Bolivia, Canada, Paraguay and Peru.<sup>57</sup> In the case of Paraguay, the end of the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which regulated the Paraguayan participation, meant that the country had to seek other opportunities to facilitate its participation in UN missions. In May 2015, the Brazilian Embassy in Asunción reported that local authorities were discussing about the possibility of participation within Spanish contingents deployed to UN peace operations.<sup>58</sup> This report points, therefore, to the positional aspect of status, since Brazil lost its status in Paraguay regarding peacekeeping participation with the end of the MOU. While Brazil had been an important player in facilitating Paraguay's initial experience of providing troops, Paraguay was now seeking the assistance of other players that could facilitate its participation – a situation that also indicates the perceptual dimension of status, with Paraguayan authorities no longer relying on Brazil.

#### IV The Development of Mobile Training Teams (MTT) by CCOPAB

According to CCOPAB, the center's MTT were developed in order to achieve the following goals: present and disseminate UN training material; support the host country in the capacity-building of human resources to provide training for military, police and civilians to be deployed in UN peace missions; increase cooperation between Brazil and the host country in the area of peacekeeping.<sup>59</sup> One essential component of why CCOPAB has developed MTT is directly linked to the fact that Brazilian Army officers selected to serve as commanders of CCOPAB have normally served previously at DPKO, or at the Brazilian Mission to the UN, meaning that they have been socialized on the UN peacekeeping system. At least four of the last CCOPAB commanders, have served at DPKO prior to holding their position at CCOPAB. For example, General José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes, who served as CCOPAB's commander and at DPKO for four years, was the officer responsible for introducing MTT to CCOPAB in 2014.<sup>60</sup> In

57 In light of the UNSC resolution 2180, the Brazilian contingent was reduced from 1230 to 850. Telegraphic dispatch 214 from SERE to Brazilian Embassy in Lima date: 25/03/2015; Telegraphic dispatch 214 from SERE to Brazilian Embassy in Lima date: 25/03/2015.

58 Telegram 528 from Brazilian Embassy in Asunción to SERE date: 07/05/2015.

59 Hebert de Souza Lemos and Vinícius Cordeiro Ramirez, 'The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center and its Mobile Training Teams: An Exquisite Brazilian Tool for Alignment With the United Nations in South-South Cooperation Activities', *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2016, p. 85–86.

60 General Vendramin served as Military Observer and Military Staff Officer in the UN peacekeeping operation in Angola and later as Chief Military Training Officer in the mission

addition to the role played by individuals, officers based at CCOPAB confirm that the development and deployment of MTT by CCOPAB was influenced by DPKO's 2013 global analysis on training, which noted a lack of knowledge related to UN produced Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM).<sup>61</sup>

Brazil's decision to diffuse its recently acquired expertise in the domain of peacekeeping training is also related to the perception that the end of MINUSTAH could eventually not be followed by another deployment of Brazilian troops to UN missions, at least not in a short-term framework. Uncertainties regarding subsequent engagements, which included speculation of future contributions to missions in the Middle East or Africa, presented a challenge for maintaining a range of institutional and financial efforts that for several years had sustained the consolidation and expansion of CCOPAB. In this perspective, the creation of CCOPAB's MTT should be understood as an opportunity to maintain the CCOPAB staff actively engaged at a moment in which MINUSTAH would end and Brazil would not yet be involved in another UN mission requiring the same level of troop commitment.<sup>62</sup> This perspective can be seen as strongly related to the perceptual dimension of status – participating in MTT preserves Brazil's understanding of its self-proclaimed expertise acquired within MINUSTAH. It also supports the social dimension of status, since the existence of MTT reinforces the belief within the international community that Brazil is an important player in the domain of training for peacekeeping participation.

It is important to note that although the MTT are deployed by CCOPAB, the decision on their deployment is a prerogative of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense deriving from political consultations involving the ministry and the host country.<sup>63</sup> While the decision as to where the teams will be deployed is a

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in Syria. He was also an exchange international instructor at the Argentine Joint Peace Operations Training Center and UN Training Officer at DPKO. For more information, see: [https://www.peaceopstraining.org/poti/board\\_of\\_directors/](https://www.peaceopstraining.org/poti/board_of_directors/).

- 61 José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes and Carlos Alberto Cavalcanti, 'Projeto de Implantação de Equipes Móveis de Treinamento (EMT)', *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, 2015, pp. 153.
- 62 Brazil's current troop deployment, initiated in 2011, involves a warship and its 250 crew within the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Emergency Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is in itself a very specific deployment. For further information on Brazil's involvement in UNIFIL see: Antonio Ruy de Almeida Silva; Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga & Danilo Marcondes 'The Brazilian Participation in UNIFIL: Raising Brazil's Profile in International Peace and Security in the Middle East?', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 60, no. 2, 2017, pp. 1–19.
- 63 Interview with Brazilian Army officer serving at CCOPAB, May 2017.

prerogative of the Ministry of Defense, as of early 2015, the leadership at CCOPAB prepared a list of countries that could potentially host MTT. The list is composed of a series of 'friendly' nations and includes countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru), Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Togo), and Asia/Oceania (Timor Leste).<sup>64</sup> The list reveals a wide range of Brazilian foreign policy priorities, including different countries in which Brazilian defense and military expertise influences local authorities. This connects directly with the positional, perceptual and social dimensions of status. The list of countries reflects countries where Brazilian authorities perceive that Brazil has already acquired status via a comparative advantage, either because of the positive repercussion of its involvement in MINUSTAH or because of cultural affinities and previous history of bilateral security/military cooperation.

CCOPAB's first MTT was sent to Angola for a period of four days in December 2014.<sup>65</sup> The team included five officers from the Brazilian Army and one from the Brazilian Navy, all of them instructors at CCOPAB. The team trained a total of 22 Angolan students, including military officers, police officers and civilians at the National Demining Institute, located around Luanda. The team taught an Introductory Action Course on Landmines in Peace Operations.<sup>66</sup> The deployment of CCOPAB's first mobile training team to Angola generated immediate praise from Angolan authorities.<sup>67</sup> CCOPAB's second mobile training team was also sent to Angola in May 2015, when a team was responsible for teaching Subunit Commanders Course and a Platoon Leaders Course.<sup>68</sup> The fact that the first two teams were sent to Angola is illustrative of the relevant

64 José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes and Carlos Alberto Cavalcanti, 'Projeto de Implantação de Equipes Móveis de Treinamento (EMT)', *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, 2015, p. 150.

65 Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, from CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2014/691-ccopab-envia-sua-primeira-equipe-movel-de-treinamento-emt-a-angola>.

66 In Portuguese: *Curso de Introdução à Ação contra Minas em Operações de Paz*.

67 The Commander of the Angolan Army visited CCOPAB in April 2015 and thanked CCOPAB for dispatching the team. Further information about the visit can be found in Portuguese at: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2015/726-visita-do-comandante-do-exercito-de-angola>.

68 In Portuguese: *Curso de Preparação para Comandantes de Subunidade e Pelotão –EPCO-SUPEL*; Nunes, José Ricardo Vendramin and Cavalcanti, Carlos Alberto, 'Projeto de Implantação de Equipes Móveis de Treinamento (EMT)', *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, 2015, p. 152.

bilateral defense cooperation that was built between the two countries during the Lula and Rousseff administrations.<sup>69</sup>

CCOPAB's third MTT was sent to Colombia in June 2015 for a ten day course offered in Bogotá.<sup>70</sup> The team offered a UN Staff Officer Course to three officers from the Colombian Navy, 21 from the Colombian Army, two from the Colombian Air Force and one civilian professor at ESMAI.<sup>71</sup> The team was innovative because it included one Brazilian Navy officer, three Brazilian Army officers and one French Army officer, all serving as instructors at CCOPAB.<sup>72</sup> The incorporation of a foreign officer in the team reveals the interest on the part actors from the Global North in the Brazilian expertise in training for peacekeeping participation and reinforces Brazil's status.

After the deployment to Colombia, CCOPAB sent a MTT to Angola for a period of over two weeks between August and September 2015.<sup>73</sup> This was CCOPAB's third mobile training team to Angola in a period of less than one year. The Brazilian team was in Angola to conduct a Commander of Military Unit and Staff Officer Course and a Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course.<sup>74</sup> Following the team sent to Angola, CCOPAB sent a MTT to Mozambique in November 2015 to teach a one week course on the UN's Core

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69 For example, as early as 2008, during the Lula administration, the Brazilian Embassy in Luanda suggested that Brazil should expand its defense cooperation with Angola. Brazilian diplomats based in Luanda noted, at the time, that Angola was participating in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) missions but that the Angolan Army and Air Force did not have much experience in peace operations. According to the diplomats, Brazil's experience, especially CIOpPaz, could be of interest to the Angolan side. Telegraphic dispatch 220 from SERE to Brazilian Ministry of Defense date: 25/04/2008.

70 The course was offered at the at the *Escuela de Misiones Internacionales y Acción Integral* (ESMAI).

71 In Portuguese: *Curso de Oficial de Estado-Maior das Nações Unidas*.

72 Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, from CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2015/742-equipe-movel-de-treinamento-inicia-curso-na-colombia>.

73 Nunes, José Ricardo Vendramin and Cavalcanti, Carlos Alberto, 'Projeto de Implantação de Equipes Móveis de Treinamento (EMT)', *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, 2015, p.152.

74 In Portuguese: *Curso de Preparação para Comandantes de Organizações Militares e Estado-Maior-EPCOEM.*; In Portuguese: *Curso de Preparação para Comandantes de Subunidade e Pelotão –EPCOSUPEL*. Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, at the CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/fr/noticias-do-centro/2015/763-ccopab-envia-equipe-movel-de-treinamento-para-angola>.

Pre-deployment Training Material.<sup>75</sup> At the time of the MTT, Mozambique had no deployments to UN missions.<sup>76</sup>

A second MTT was sent to Colombia in June 2016 for a period of approximately two weeks (10–23 June), offering an opportunity for CCOPAB officers to familiarize themselves with the Colombian Army's educational and doctrinal structures.<sup>77</sup>

In September 2016, CCOPAB sent a MTT to Namibia. The team conducted two types of courses, one for the training of instructors for peace operations and one for staff officers in peacekeeping contingents.<sup>78</sup> At the time of the MTT, Namibia had a relevant individual police and experts on mission contributions but a small troop contribution.<sup>79</sup> The deployment of the team was facilitated by the existence of a Brazilian Army Cooperative Mission with the Namibian Army, which included a Brazilian officer as military advisor within the Namibian Army's Training and Educational System.<sup>80</sup> The deployment of this team to Namibia is also revealing of interesting domestic developments associated with the Brazilian Armed Forces. Initially, it was intended that the

75 Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, from CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/fr/noticias-do-centro/2015/788-ccopab-envia-equipe-movel-de-treinamento-para-mocambique>.

76 Mozambique was not listed in the UN list of country contributions for late 2015, see: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/nov15\\_3.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/nov15_3.pdf).

77 Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, from CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2016/845-emt-do-ccopab-inicia-sua-missao-na-colombia> In the specific case of Colombia, the Brazilian Navy continued to be a relevant player regarding training for peacekeeping participation. In March 2016, 12 members of the Colombian Armed Forces, 11 from the Navy and 1 from the Air Force, completed a Military Observers Course, in the same period, 19 members of the Colombian Navy completed the Peace Operations Contingent Preparation Course with the support of the Brazilian Navy at the Colombian Navy's *Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación de Operaciones de Paz* (CENCOPAZ) in the municipality of Coveñas. The course was offered by the same officers of the Brazilian Navy which had participated in the 2015 demining course in Colombia. Brazilian cooperation with Colombia related to training for peacekeeping participation has intensified particularly after Colombia celebrated a framework agreement with the UN in January 2015 regarding future Colombian contributions to UN peacekeeping.

78 Information about this specific mobile training team is available, in Portuguese, from CCOPAB's website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2016/881-ccopab-envia-equipe-movel-de-treinamento-para-a-namibia>.

79 For a detailed distribution of Namibia's participation in UN missions see: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/aug16\\_3.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/aug16_3.pdf).

80 Equipe Móvel de Treinamento-Namíbia 2016 CCOPAB Relatório Final de Missão (EB: 0122369.00004069/2016-62).

team would include officers from the Brazilian Navy and the Air Force but since it was the Brazilian Army and not the Ministry of Defense that covered the costs associated with the team, the team only included Brazilian Army personnel.<sup>81</sup> This reveals that there are issues that still need to be addressed regarding coordination between the three branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces.

The most recent MTT to be deployed by CCOPAB was sent to Mexico in November 2017. This deployment indicates a clear connection with social and perceptual dimensions of status since it involves Brazil sending a team to a country that is not located in Brazil's immediate regional neighborhood and that has for many years attempted to participate with troops in UN missions. The team stayed in Mexico for ten days and offered a Sub-Unit and Platoon Commander Internship Course to 31 members of the Mexican Army and 10 of the Mexican Marine Corps.<sup>82</sup> At the time of the MTT, Mexico only had experts on mission (Colombia and Western Sahara) and one staff officer (Central African Republic) deployed to UN missions.<sup>83</sup> The decision to send a team to Mexico was motivated by Mexico's interest in strengthening cooperation in military education with Brazil.<sup>84</sup>

The list of MTT already deployed by CCOPAB reveals that officers based at CCOPAB have already acknowledged the connection between the initiatives and Brazil's status:

MTT can serve as an efficient means to disseminate an image of Brazil as a positive and competent actor becoming an element of real importance for a large number of friendly nations which lack training and preparation for missions under DPKO's leadership.<sup>85</sup>

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81 Equipe Móvel de Treinamento-Namíbia 2016 CCOPAB Relatório Final de Missão (EB: 0122369.00004069/2016-62).

82 In Portuguese: *Estágio de Preparação de Comandantes de Subunidade e Pelotão*; Further information about the mobile training team deployed to Mexico can be found, in Portuguese, at: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/145-2017/982-ccopab-capacita-militares-mexicanos-para-atuarem-em-missoes-de-paz>.

83 For details regarding the Mexican contribution to UN missions, see: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary\\_of\\_contributions\\_to\\_un\\_peacekeeping\\_by\\_country\\_and\\_post.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_by_country_and_post.pdf).

84 The deployment of an MTT to Mexico evolved from a specific contact with CCOPAB: In May 2016, a delegation from Mexico's National Defense Secretariat visited CCOPAB and familiarized itself with the center. For details regarding the visit by the Mexican delegation see: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/noticias-do-centro/2016/840-comitativa-da-secretaria-da-defesa-nacional-do-mexico-visita-o-ccopab-2>.

85 Author's translation from the original quote in Portuguese; Nunes, José Ricardo Vendramin and Cavalcanti, Carlos Alberto, 'Projeto de Implantação de Equipes Móveis de

The development of mobile training teams by Brazil's CCOPAB has further strengthened Brazil's role within the international division of labor associated with UN peacekeeping. Drawing on a parallel from Tickner's analysis of the Colombia-US security cooperation, Brazil's role can be understood as part of a triangulation with the UN, in which "specific productive functions traditionally located in core countries are transferred to peripheral ones that have achieved a certain degree of development and growth".<sup>86</sup> In the case of the MTT, Brazil has taken the productive functions, traditionally performed by the UN (with the participation of Northern countries), and is now transferring UN norms within the Global South, including via pre-deployment training.<sup>87</sup> The comparison with Colombia is also suitable when discussing the financial implications. Brazilian MTT, whose financial and personnel costs are covered by the Brazilian government, reinforce Brazil's role as a country that "occupies crucial security functions with greater effectiveness and lower cost".<sup>88</sup> The lower cost of Brazilian training for peacekeeping participation, especially if compared to Northern assistance, also illustrates the positional dimension of status. One additional element involves potential trilateral cooperation initiatives associated with training for peacekeeping, benefiting from an association with Brazil. For example, CCOPAB officers mentioned that Sweden is interested in funding a Brazilian MTT in Mali, which further reinforces the perceptual, positional and social dimensions of status.<sup>89</sup>

While there are certainly positive elements associated with the deployment of MTT, it is important to note that the Brazilian decision to provide those teams is motivated by the confirmation on the part of the host country that the country will be deploying troops to UN mission in the future. So far, it is relevant to note that, according to UN figures, as of March 2018, Colombia, Mexico and Namibia had only deployed staff officers, individual police and experts on

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Treinamento (EMT), *Revista CCOPAB e Operações de Paz: Visões, Reflexões e Lições Aprendidas*, 2015, p. 154.

86 Arlene B. Tickner, 'Associated Dependent Security Cooperation: Colombia and the United States' in Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller (eds.), *The Global Making of Policing: Postcolonial Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 108.

87 Georgina Holmes, 'Situating Agency, Embodied Practices and Norm Implementation in Peacekeeping Training', *International Peacekeeping*, August 2018, pp. 1–30.

88 Arlene B. Tickner, 'Associated Dependent Security Cooperation: Colombia and the United States' in Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller (eds.), *The Global Making of Policing: Postcolonial Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 109.

89 The information is based on remarks by Brazilian officers based at CCOPAB in the II Seminar of the Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations (*Rede Brasileira de Pesquisa em Operações de Paz-REBRAPAZ*), held in Rio de Janeiro on July 2018. The seminar was organized under Chatham House rules.

missions to UN peace missions and Angola was not a contributor to UN missions.<sup>90</sup> In addition to the case of Mozambique in 2008, there are recent examples of bilateral discussions about cooperation for training for peacekeeping that did not lead to concrete initiatives, such as bilateral conversations with South Africa in 2009 and in 2013.<sup>91</sup>

## v Final Considerations

The analysis presented here argues that the experience within MINUSTAH provided Brazilian actors with an accumulated knowledge regarding addressing some of the challenges associated with contemporary UN peace missions. This knowledge was mobilized to help CCOPAB develop MTT by way of which Brazil could diffuse its experience within other countries of the Global South, particularly countries which Brazilian actors wanted to influence politically.

The Brazilian engagement in SSC for UN peacekeeping training is understood here as a process through which Brazil tries to rearticulate its position in the global architecture of UN peacekeeping, particularly with an interest in maintaining and improving its international status. The consolidation of CCOPAB's MTT, although still considered a timid experimentation in the context of a peacekeeping "training of trainers" exercise, moves Brazil from a position of recipient of a training expertise to that of a "donor" one, from which the country contributes to diffuse consolidated norms and knowledge on UN peacekeeping. This political move can be interpreted as a desire on the part of Brazilian decision makers to renegotiate a peripheral stance in the global governance of UN peace operations. Nevertheless, this new authoritative position is permeated by several ambiguities and limitations. Although this change of status allows the country to "play the game" traditionally led by Global North countries and training institutions, it simultaneously reinforces an original

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90 A detailed breakdown of peacekeeping contributions by UN member states is available at: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4\\_country\\_and\\_post\\_o.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4_country_and_post_o.pdf).

91 During a 2009 visit to South Africa, Brazil's Defense Minister offered the possibility of Brazil sharing its experience in participating in UN peacekeeping including with the possibility of South African officers attending courses at Brazil's peacekeeping training center. Telegraphic dispatch 239 from SERE to Brazilian Ministry of Defense date: 31/03/2009; in 2013, Brazil and South Africa discussed the possibility of developing cooperation between their respective peacekeeping training centers during the first meeting of the joint defense committee in Brasilia. Telegraphic dispatch 272 from SERE to Brazilian Embassy in Pretoria date: 15/03/2013.

subordinated position in the UN peacekeeping system in which a global division of labor has been historically consolidated:

(...) the Global North has the power of not only defining what peace is, and what it means, but also how it should be pursued and its construction operationalized throughout the globe. On the other hand, the Global South is responsible for building the kind of peace that reflects the characterization defined by the former.<sup>92</sup>

While, as sustained by Blanco, the Global North is responsible for setting the ontology and methodologies that shape UN peace operations, post-colonial states are the main providers of troops. Even when Brazil's engagement with peace operations goes beyond troop contribution and is extended to the training field, it keeps revealing a "myopic and subaltern" engagement.<sup>93</sup> In this perspective, the South-South dimension of Brazil's contribution to peacekeeping training – although allowing the country to act more closely to those that occupy what the Brazilian Army frequently describes as the "arch of knowledge" – it is not a transformative movement of the structures that have sustained the field of practices associated with UN peace operations.<sup>94</sup>

The present research has shown how the Southern vector of Brazil's cooperation investments in UN peacekeeping training responds to a logic of status seeking in the regional/international system. CCOPAB's MTT advance Brazil's influence mostly over countries less equipped to engage in UN peacekeeping and in other defense/security tasks. This Southern dimension of Brazil's engagement is valued by the UN itself since, on the one hand, it reduces claims regarding the perpetuation of a Northern hegemony. Brazil supposedly contributes, therefore, to "neutralize" the lingering (neo)colonial aspects that still permeate parts of the training architecture for peacekeeping.

On the other hand, Brazil's contributions to reinforcing African military capacity for peacekeeping participation have to be considered in light on the role that "enhanced national military forces could play in the future in these

92 Ramon Blanco, 'The Brazilian Engagement with Peace Operations: a Critical Analysis', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 60, no. 2, 2017, p.9.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

94 The arch of knowledge refers to highly developed countries in North America, Europe and Asia where the Brazilian Army is interested in sending its officers to participate in training courses and other exchange opportunities. These countries are also identified as strategic partners in science and technology projects. The term is referenced in the Brazilian Army Directive for International Affairs (In Portuguese: *Diretriz para as Atividades do Exército Brasileiro na Área Internacional*) for the years 2013 and 2016.

state's domestic arenas or in regional rivalries and disputes".<sup>95</sup> In this regard, one should also interrogate how South-South cooperation for peacekeeping training may impact on civil-military relations domestically, especially in contexts such as in Brazil in which the Armed Forces, including officers with experience in MINUSTAH, have increasingly been engaged, in a very contested way, in public security routines and functions.<sup>96</sup>

By looking at the diffusion of Brazilian expertise and status seeking via the MTT, we have come to the conclusion that the Brazilian experience reveals the limitations and challenges associated with the dissemination of knowledge and experiences within the Global South. The recognition of these limitations reinforces the idea that "what counts as expertise needs to be local, site-specific, and narrowed to particular critical moments within the activity, discipline, and site in question".<sup>97</sup> In this regard, we claim here that Brazil's recently accumulated expertise in regards to training for peacekeeping is centered on the country's 13 years of deployment in MINUSTAH, which in itself was a very context-specific mission. MINUSTAH was the UN's first stabilization mission, a mission with a contingent pool drawn mostly from Latin American countries and a mission mainly characterized by patrolling and police-related tasks in an urban setting. These specific elements draw attention to the differences between MINUSTAH and the majority of existing UN missions, including those deployed on the African continent and where the majority of states hosting Brazilian MTT are expected to participate.

While claims have been made by the Brazilian Armed Forces that their long and well-praised experience in MINUSTAH adds quality to the transfer of training instructions overseas, further contributions should investigate how much leverage for adaptation and creativity exists when the primary goal of the ITS training is precisely that member states and training institutions replicate UN developed teaching materials. The acknowledgement of this particular aspect of ITS training raises the question of how far do MINUSTAH practices, from

95 Daniëlle Beswick, 'The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda', *African Affairs*, vol. 113, no. 451, April 2014, pp. 213.

96 Maira Siman and Victória Santos, 'Interrogating the Security–Development Nexus in Brazil's Domestic and Foreign Pacification Engagements', *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2018, pp. 61–83; Kristian Hoelscher and Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, 'Urban Violence and the Militarisation of Security: Brazilian "Peacekeeping" in Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 25, no. 5–6, 2014, pp. 957–975; Christoph Harig, 'Synergy Effects Between MINUSTAH and Public Security in Brazil', *Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2015, pp. 142–168.

97 Leah Sprain and Lydia Reinig, 'Citizens Speaking as Experts: Expertise Discourse in Deliberative Forums', *Environmental Communication*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2018, p. 359.

the perspective of Brazilian actors, can “travel”. Although UN materials do not reach the tactical level, the present research has not been able to evaluate how Brazilian officers transfer their own knowledge and experience, especially at the micro-level. Moreover, one should also interrogate how the usual two-week scope of UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials makes a difference at all to those at the receiving end. Beyond the notion that “missions are not training academies” questions can also be raised about the impact of short teaching sessions.<sup>98</sup>

Moreover, the analysis of the role of Brazil in the diffusion of training expertise allows for the unpacking of the ambiguities of Brazil’s postcolonial condition and the tensions that pervade the country’s engagements in the domain of international peace and security. Since Brazil is not the only rising power from the Global South to be deploying MTT related to peacekeeping training with its Southern partners, future contributions could provide comparative analysis between Brazil, India and South Africa regarding the provision of training for peace and security related activities.<sup>99</sup> In addition, our article brings out an even more important question, drawing on recent contributions regarding African capacity building and training for peacekeeping participation: How countries involved in providing assistance in training for peacekeeping deployment can look at the wide range of implications associated with their engagement, both domestically and internationally, and well beyond status and expertise considerations?

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98 Anne Flaspöler, ‘Adding Peacekeepers to the Debates of Critical Liberal Peacebuilding: New Insights from the Perspective of Peacekeeping Training in Africa’, *Peacebuilding*, vol. 4, no. 3, April 2016, p. 242.

99 For an example of India’s MTT see: <http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28793/Indian+Army+Delegation+to+impart+UN+Peacekeeping+training+to+Myanmar+Armed+Forces>.